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Modern phenomenology, with its roots in Husserlian philosophy, has been taken up and 
utilised in a myriad of ways within different disciplines, but until recently has remained 
relatively under-used within sports studies.  A corpus of sociological-phenomenological 
work is now beginning to develop in this domain, alongside a longer standing literature in 
feminist phenomenology.  These specific social-phenomenological forms explore the 
situatedness of lived-body experience within a particular social structure.  After providing 
a brief overview of key strands of phenomenology, this article considers some of the 
ways in which sociological, and particularly feminist phenomenology, might be used to 
analyse female sporting embodiment. For illustrative purposes, data from an 
autophenomenographic project on female distance running are also included, in order 
briefly to demonstrate the application of phenomenology within sociology, as both 





Within sports studies, the woman in the sporting body has been studied from 
myriad theoretical angles over the past 30 years, including via a range of ‘feminist 
prisms’ (e.g. Hall 1996; Wearing 1998).  There remains, however, a relative lacuna in 
relation to embodied research on the lived experiences of the sporting body from a 
phenomenological perspective (Hockey and Allen-Collinson 2007; Allen-Collinson 2009).  
Wacquant (2004) highlights a need to conduct research not only of the body (as an 
object of study), but also from the body – using the body as a tool of inquiry.  I argue 
here that using a form of ‘sociologised’ (see below) feminist phenomenology, can provide 
rigorous, grounded, and insightful analyses of female sporting embodiment, and 
effectively portray the complexities of sporting experiences – both cognitive and 
corporeal. Brief data from a research project on female distance running are included for 
illustrative purposes only. I should emphasize that, as a sociologist, I am working within 
the sociological-phenomenology tradition (Schutz 1967; Psathas 1973; Katz and Csordas 
2003) rather than from a philosophical base.  The openness of phenomenology to 
different readings has been noted as one of its strengths, with ‘no place for 
phenomenological orthodoxy, or for so-called “purism”’ (Mortari and Tarozzi 2010: 9). I 
address here feminist-sociological phenomenology, although for ease of reading, I use 
the term feminist phenomenology (described below).  I am thus writing as a 
phenomenologically-inspired sociologist. 
The interaction between phenomenology and feminism has furnished powerful 
analytic insights (de Beauvoir 1972; Fisher 2000). This paper considers some of the 
possibilities offered by this nexus, which at times gives rise to scepticism and disquiet on 
both ‘sides’, but also generates potent insights in examining female experience as lived 
and felt in the flesh (Young 1998).  The philosophical phenomenological quest to seek out 
‘essences’, the essential structures of experience (see below), has sometimes been 
understood as some form of essentialist quest for universal experience, neglectful of the 
specificities of biological sex, and of gender and other forms of  social-structural 
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‘situatededness’.  As I consider below, feminist phenomenology addresseses such 
criticisms head-on by acknowledging the powerful influences and constraints of social 
structure upon lived experience, and the corporeal specifics of bodies that are located in 
time and culture.   
 To date, studies of sporting experience employing a phenomenological theoretical 
framework remain relatively under-developed (Kerry and Armour 2000; Allen-Collinson 
2009), although a literature is gradually developing. The following studies provide just a 
flavour of this oeuvre, drawing primarily upon existential phenomenology, particularly 
Merleau-Ponty’s work on the body as subject of perception.  Masciotra et al. (2001), for 
example, provide a detailed, phenomenologically-grounded account of spatio-temporal 
distancing and co-ordination in Karate, whilst Bar-on Cohen (2006) addresses ‘somatic 
codes‘  (words verbalising interior body dynamics) and pedagogy in Karate training. The 
dialectical relationship between ‘player-body-subject’ and the lived-space of the playing 
field is observed in football/ soccer by Hughson and Inglis (2002) and Hemphill (2005).  
For those researching mind-body practices and physical cultures, Merleau-Ponty has 
proved a fertile source. Samudra (2008) portrays kinaesthetic experiences in Silat 
Bangau Putih, a Chinese-Indonesian self-defense and health system. Morley (2001) 
examines yoga practice utilising Merleau-Pontian constructs and drawing comparisons 
between the practice of yoga and phenomenology itself, including epochē/bracketing (see 
below). Addressing sports and physical activity more generally, Hockey and Allen-
Collinson (2007) explore the sensory dimension of the sporting body, applying Merleau-
Ponty’s (2001) work. 
 The article is structured as follows.  First, for those unfamiliar with the tenets of 
phenomenology, a basic overview is provided, before moving to sociological- 
phenomenology and feminist phenomenology respectively. Phenomenology is used 
variously as epistemology, theoretical perspective, methodology and method (Mortari 
and Tarozzi 2010) and sometimes as a combination of all these.  An overview of the 
phenomenological method is therefore also given. Briefly to illustrate its application as 
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method, I then describe an autophenomenographic research project on female 
middle/long-distance running. 
 
The multiple strands of phenomenology 
Different ontological and epistemological positions underlie the many and complex 
strands of the ‘tangled web of phenomenology’ (Ehrich 1999: 20) and here I can only 
touch upon this complex, protean and nuanced perspective (see Allen-Collinson, 2009, 
for a recent overview in relation to sports studies).  Inevitably, much of the richness and 
complexity is lost in such a brief resumé, and as Spiegelberg (1982) notes, there are as 
many styles of phenomenology as there are phenomenologists.  Described as arguably 
the major philosophical movement of the twentieth century (Embree and Mohanty 1997: 
1), phenomenology is the study of phenomena, things as they present themselves to, 
and are perceived in consciousness. Phenomenology as philosophy was originally 
developed by Husserl as a radical new approach to remedying what he considered the 
lamentable inadequacies of positivist scientific approaches to studying the nature of 
human existence.  Husserl sought to reinstate the importance of the subjective 
dimension, arguing for the experiential basis of all knowledge. Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
(2001: vii), one of the key exponents of existentialist phenomenology, wrote that the 
question of what phenomenology actually is, had by no means been resolved. Part of the 
problem (if problem it is) lies perhaps in the different ontological and epistemological 
positions underlying the distinctive strands of phenomenology.  
Embree and Mohanty (1997) posit four key strands or ‘tendencies’ within 
phenomenology: realist, transcendental constitutive, hermeneutic, and existentialist.  
Although there are many more forms of phenomenology, a brief description of the latter 
three strands, as particularly apposite to sports studies, may prove helpful. I should 
emphasize that what are portrayed here for heuristic purposes as distinct strands are 
actually overlapping; the work of some theorists transcends categories, and we could 
argue long as to who sits where within the phenomenological enterprise.  With this firm 
caveat then, I portray the three tendencies as follows. 
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1) Transcendental or constitutive phenomenology is grounded in Husserl’s (1983 
[1913]) Ideas and subsequent work. As Embree and Mohanty (1977) indicate, 
constitutive phenomenology relates broadly to the notion that we are simultaneously in 
and part of the world into which we are born.  This strand is transcendental in seeking to 
transcend our framework of everyday, tacit presuppositions and taken-for-granted 
assumptions about phenomena - including ‘scientific’ assumptions, interpretations and 
abstractions. Husserl’s idealist transcendental phenomenology aimed to develop a 
method to yield absolute essential knowledge or universal laws of facts (Jennings 1986: 
1235). Transcendental phenomenology is primarily descriptive, utilising the techniques of 
epochē and reduction (defined below) to suspend or bracket the natural attitude, our 
everyday beliefs and presuppositions about a phenomenon, in order to arrive at its 
essences - as Husserl advocated, to return ‘to the things themselves’ (zu den Sachen 
selbst).  Husserl initially sought not only the suspension of beliefs and assumptions, but 
also the bracketing of oneself from the ‘natural world’ via the transcendental reduction, in 
order to attain a pure transcendental consciousness.  The notion of ‘transcendental 
subjectivity’ was interpreted by some as unattainably idealistic and thus subjected to 
mordant critique, leading Husserl to refocus his later work toward the development of a 
theory of intersubjectivity using the concept of the Lebenswelt - the commonsense life-
world of everyday experience; a conception that stimulated much sociological interest. 
Alfred Schutz (1967, 1973), for example, synthesized aspects of Husserl’s concept of the 
life-world to create a phenomenological sociology or sociological phenomenology (Wagner 
1973) (see below), and inspired the radical thinking of Harold Garfinkel (1984), the 
originator of ethnomethodology. 
In recent times, Giorgi (1985) has contributed a significant body of work within 
the general spirit of descriptive, empirical phenomenology, applied to psychology and 
adhering closely to Husserlian descriptive phenomenology. Within studies of sport and 
physical culture, examples of research that employ transcendental descriptive 
phenomenology include Morley’s (2001) study of breath control in yoga, which also 
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contrasts transcendental with existentialist forms of phenomenology. Moe (2004) uses 
both transcendental and hermeneutic phenomenology to explore processes of skill 
acquisition in sport. 
2) Hermeneutic phenomenology focuses upon the context, intention and meaning 
surrounding a text or representation. Whilst transcendental phenomenology advocates a 
descriptive approach, hermeneutic phenomenology emphasizes the interpretive. 
Heidegger, whilst often characterised as an existential phenomenologist, posits that all 
description is always fundamentally interpretative, and argues (1962) against the 
possibility of our being (Sein) as open to bracketing or suspension, given its predating of, 
and pre-eminence over consciousness.  For Heidegger (1962), humans are ‘thrown into’ 
the world, and experience it directly through a kind of encompassing sight or 
circumspection (Umsicht), developing a certain know-how or intuitive coping skill. Within 
sports studies, hermeneutic phenomenology has been employed for example by Ryba 
(2008), to examine young athletes’ experiences of figure skating, and Breivik (2010) in 
relation to skydiving as a condition not of ‘being-in-the-world’, in a Heideggerian sense, 
but rather of ‘being-in-the-void’. 
3) Existentialist phenomenology draws upon the work of major French 
existentialists such as Simone de Beauvoir, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
who wedded existentialism and phenomenology (Ehrich 1999: 28) in a powerful analytic 
framework.  Existentialist phenomenology highlights the centrality of the body in human 
experience, one’s own body (le corps propre) as the subject of perception, the standpoint 
from which the world is perceived and experienced (Merleau-Ponty 2001).  This focus on 
embodiment - the social and cultural ways in which we live our bodies in everyday life – 
is clearly of salience within sport sociology.  Whitehead (2007), the originator of the 
‘physical literacy’ perspective, argues that perception and bodily action form the basis of 
meaning, not created as a result of applying rules of cognition, but arising through our 
embodied interaction with the world. 
 8 
Existential phenomenologists emphasize human existential unity with the chair 
(flesh) of the world. In his later work, Merleau-Ponty recast the ‘lived body’ of his earlier 
writings as chair  in order better ‘to capture its primordial or elemental character’ (Morley 
2001: 75), to convey more vividly the continuity of world and body. Merleau-Ponty’s 
(1969) focus upon the sensory dimensions of embodiment and his concept of reversibility 
(2001: 93) also have high applicability to sociological studies of sporting embodiment 
(see Hockey and Allen-Collinson 2007). Reversibility refers to the notion that our sense 
perceptions are reversible: we both touch and are touched, see and are seen, and so on.  
So Merleau-Ponty (2001: 93) suggests that the experience of touching, for example, 
cannot be understood without reference to the possibility of situational reversal.  In 
relation to sportspeople, the haptic relationship is not just with other participants but also 
with objects and the general environment (Allen-Collinson and Hockey 2011).  
Importantly too, for sociological-phenomenology, existentialist phenomenology highlights 
the situatedness of human experience, including gendered experience and behaviour (de 
Beauvoir 1974; Young 1980).   
Sociological and feminist phenomenology 
Husserl’s phenomenology was first applied extensively within North American sociology 
by Alfred Schutz, whose work was initially considered as phenomenological psychology 
given its focus upon inner, subjective experience.  Subsequently, Schutz’s (1967, 1973) 
attention turned toward the Husserlian conception of the life-world (Lebenswelt).  He 
adapted and synthesized aspects of Husserl’s thinking with Max Weber’s theory of 
Verstehen and social action to create a phenomenological-sociology or sociological- 
phenomenology (Wagner 1973), and his sociological interest was particularly sparked by 
Husserl’s investigations into intersubjective communities.  As Liberman (2009: 149) 
notes, Husserl’s work on ‘intersubjective constitution’ generally was taken up 
enthusiastically by researchers in sociology. Another key perspective in sociological-
phenomenological thinking developed from the work of Berger and Luckmann (1966) on 
the social construction of reality, and the ways in which social actors jointly construct and 
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sustain reality via social interaction.  Berger and Luckmann examined how such ‘reality’ 
can become embedded within society and transmitted generationally, including via 
taken-for-granted ‘common sense’ knowledge.  Feminist writers working from a social-
constructionist perspective have emphasized that what becomes accepted as knowledge 
is not necessarily a ‘scientific’ or indeed a neutral process, but dependent upon the power 
of social groups to promote their own ideas of what constitutes (or should constitute) 
‘reality’ and counts as ‘knowledge’.  Much of what has been constructed as universal, 
human reality, and neutral, gender-free knowledge, has been challenged by feminist 
writers as partial, masculinist and androcentric. Such partialness might  also apply to the 
realities of other social groups marginalised under male (heterosexual) hegemonic 
discourse, such as black and minority ethnic groups, for example. The feminist critique of 
‘traditional’ (masculinist) phenomenology has been trenchant and far-reaching. 
Just as there are myriad forms of phenomenology, there are similarly many and 
varied forms of feminism, from the materialist social-structural orientation of Marxist 
feminism to the linguistic constructionist perspectives of poststructuralist feminism, and 
beyond. In very general terms, though, feminist phenomenology allies phenomenology 
with the feminist theoretical focus upon the social-structural position of women in a 
patriarchal system of gender relations, where women as a social group are systematically 
disadvantaged in relation to men as a social group.  Although Martín Alcoff ‘take[s] it as a 
given that phenomenology needs feminism’ (2000: 39), the nexus is not always a 
comfortable one. Postmodernist or poststructuralist feminist theorists, for example, with 
their focus upon the discursive production of subjects and subjectivities, are unlikely to 
embrace the material ‘corporeality’ of existential phenomenology. Feminists of the body, 
however, have engaged with the writings of existentialist phenomenologists such as de 
Beauvoir’s and Merleau-Ponty, subjecting to mordant critique the dominance of ‘reason’ 
and the systematic denial of the role of the body (e.g. Grosz 1994). But feminists have 
also levelled trenchant criticisms at forms of ‘traditional phenomenology’ (Fisher 2000) 
for insufficient recognition of, and analytic attention to ‘difference’, including differences 
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of sex, gender and sexuality, and importantly for assuming that ‘male equals universal’.  
Butler (2006), for instance, takes to task Merleau-Ponty for his lack of specificity 
regarding the kinds of bodies and sexualities he analyses, and his uncritical, implicit 
assumption of the male body as norm; an ironic failure to bracket his own 
presuppositions about what is generic.  Other feminist theorists (for example, Preston 
1996; Fisher 2000), argue that despite undoubted lacunae in his analysis, Merleau-
Ponty's account of the body can in fact help us grasp significant aspects of human 
existence that span distinctions such as class, ‘race’, and gender.1 Furthermore, as Fisher 
(2000: 25) points out, traditional phenomenology provides a good basic framework, 
which is then open to application to experiential specificities, such as those of women. 
 In relation to female embodiment, feminist phenomenology is well-placed to 
provide a powerful analysis of women’s lived-body experience as both biologically 
specific, and also situated within a particular historical social structure. For feminist 
phenomenologists, the ‘personal’ of phenomenology (first-person, subjective, 
experientially-grounded) is fundamentally linked to the ‘political’ (located within wider 
social, political and ideological structures). De Beauvoir’s (1972) analysis of the 
phenomenology of ‘sexual difference’ in The Second Sex2 provides an early example of 
the potent feminism/existential phenomenology nexus, combining the insights of 
existential phenomenology with a gender-sensitive analysis in order to address issues of 
female Dasein (being-in-the-world).  In her ground-breaking work, de Beauvoir 
problematises many of the taken-for-granted assumptions of her (and our) time 
surrounding the ‘naturalness’ and biological basis of womanhood and female subjectivity.  
She does at some points, however, leave us with a feeling that female Dasein somehow 
contrasts unfavourably with its male counterpart.  Such negative connotations have 
subsequently been explored and challenged by subsequent feminist-phenomenological 
                                                          
1
 See the collection edited by Olkowski and Weiss (2006) on feminist interpretations of Merleau-Ponty. 
2
 A new translation of this work was published in 2009, in order to remedy the limitations of  the earlier 
Parshley English translation,, and to reinstate large sections of the text omitted by Parshley. 
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thinkers, and two contrasting examples drawn from phenomenological studies of 
women’s sporting embodiment provide illustratration. 
 Young (1980, 1998) examines female bodily comportment in her paper ‘Throwing 
like a Girl’, analysing the ways in which feminine motility and spatiality are constrained 
within a patriarchal social structure.  Young (1980: 139) critiques de Beauvoir for ‘largely 
ignoring the situatedness of the woman's actual bodily movement and orientation to its 
surroundings and its world’ and thus creating the impression that it is female biology, 
anatomy and physiology per se that are at least in part determinative of women’s 
‘unfree’ status. Revisiting ‘Throwing’ almost twenty years after initial publication, Young 
(1998) criticises her earlier work for an overemphasis on the negative aspects of female 
embodiment, subsequently according greater acknowledgement to female social agency.  
Similarly employing feminist phenomenology to strong effect, but in the realm of 
women’s mountaineering, Chisholm (2008) emphasizes the significance of the lived body 
over the category of gender, and highlights women’s agentic potential for transcending 
the constraints of the gender system via active cultivation of the body’s motility.  The 
structure-agency dialectic has also emerged as a key lived experience in analyses of 
female running in the gendered domain of ‘public’ space (Allen-Collinson 2010). 
  Sociological-phenomenology and feminist phenomenology thus add a powerful 
additional analytic element to more ‘traditional’ phenomenology in explicitly 
acknowledging and theorising the historically-specific, social-structurally elements of 
human experience and embodiment, and the specifics of bodies that are gendered, 
‘raced’, aged, with varying degrees of dis/ability, and so on. Sociological-phenomenology 
sharpens the focus upon our corporeal embeddedness within cultural and social worlds.  
In this vein, Csordas’ (2002: 244) concept of ‘somatic modes of attention’ is apposite to 
sociological-phenomenological research on sporting embodiment in its focus upon the 
‘culturally elaborated ways of attending to and with one’s body in surroundings that 
include the embodied presence of others’. I now consider: i) the application of 
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phenomenology in studies of sport and physical cultures; and ii) the principles of the 
phenomenological method. 
 
Phenomenology and sporting embodiment 
To illustrate phenomenology’s distinctiveness in portraying sporting experience, an 
exemplar drawn from Kerry and Armour (2000: 3-4) is helpful. Employing the example of 
glycogen depletion or ‘hitting the wall’ in distance running, the authors contrast a 
phenomenological and a physiological approach, where the latter seeks to hold constant 
certain variables whilst manipulating others in order to ascertain whether some 
distinctive, ‘objective’ bodily process is occurring. Phenomenologists, in contrast, 
endeavour to capture as far as possible the subjective experience and meaning of hitting 
the wall, irrespective of whether ‘the wall’ exists in any ‘objective’, physiological, cellular 
sense.  Phenomenology has long been concerned with embodiment issues, and with 
experiences and meanings of sport, exercise and movement (Arnold 1979). Given his 
interest in embodied consciousness, perception, intentionality (see below), and the ways 
in which we experience lived time-space, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology has been 
utilised to great effect in the phenomenological analysis of various sports and physical 
cultures, as highlighted above. 
In relation to embodiment and the development of sporting skills and capabilities, 
drawing on Merleau-Pontian perspectives, Crossley (2001: 123) portrays the corporeal 
schema as: ‘an incorporated bodily know-how and practical sense; a perspectival grasp 
upon the world from the “point of view” of the body’. For sportspeople, such corporeal 
know-how is developed via socialisation into specific training practices, so that the 
sporting ‘habit-body’ requires not only a cognitive understanding of its tasks, but also 
develops corporeally embedded knowledge and memory.  Crossley (2001) distinguishes 
between what we might conceptualise as two ‘layers’:  that of the ‘habit-body’ and that 
of the ‘body-at-this-moment’.  The habit-body transcends the immediate ground of 
spontaneous sensation of the-body-at-this-moment, absorbed in its immediate 
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environment, and persists over time, allowing us to perceive the world around.  The 
embodied knowledge and memory of the sporting habit-body are developed and become 
sedimented over time via habitual, everyday training practices, as portrayed for example 
in rugby (Pringle 2009), cricket (Sutton 2007), boxing (Wacquant 2004), and martial arts 
(Samudra 2008).  Phenomenology elucidates the ways in which the development of such 
skill and expertise requires sports participants to move beyond the cognitive, to develop 
a seemingly ‘natural’, pre-reflective, embodied response to situations.  Interestingly too, 
the very lack of such ‘naturalness’ has been highlighted by phenomenological writers. 
Preston (1996) addresses what we might term the ‘non-habit body’, using Young’s 
(1998) example of some women’s lack of habituation in relation to athletic practices.  
‘Throwing like a girl’ is thus viewed not so much as a property of ‘like-a-girlness’ but 
rather about engaging in unfamiliar, non-habitual practices. 
In general then, how might phenomenologically-inspired sociological researchers 
approach the task of investigating sporting practices and experiences?  The next section 
considers the phenomenological method itself, and the relatively novel approach of 
‘autophenomenography’ (Gruppetta 2004; Allen-Collinson 2011). Phenomenology’s focus 
upon the subjective dimension, and use of first-person accounts of lived experience and 
meaning, has resulted in its sometimes being erroneously conflated with qualitative 
research in general, without acknowledgement of its very distinctive philosophical 
heritage.  
 
Notes on the phenomenological method and autophenomenography 
In general, phenomenologically-inspired researchers within the social sciences assemble 
highly detailed, in-depth descriptions of subjective experience in specific contexts, and 
seek to identify their ‘essences’ (described below); the essential, but (for sociological- 
phenomenologists in particular) always situated patterns or ‘structures’ of experience as 
they appear to consciousness.  Although the different strands of phenomenology have 
their own distinctive principles and perspectives, four themes or qualities, derived from 
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Husserlian phenomenology, provide a touchstone in portraying ‘the phenomenologcal 
method’.  This, it should be emphasized, is not method in terms of a set of specific 
research techniques or procedures, but much more: an encompassing attitude, a whole 
orientation to the world, requiring, as van Manen (2000) advocates, a certain attentive 
awareness to the things of the world as we live them rather than as we more abstractly 
theorize them. We might describe the phenomenological method as an attitude of 
wonderment, an attempt to see the world through fresh, ‘naive’ eyes.  Any tight 
prescription of method(s) would run counter to the openness of this phenomenological 
enterprise.  Indeed, a whole range of methods-related questions is regularly discussed 
and debated intra and inter the strands of phenomenology (see Finlay 2009).  A brief 
explanation of the four characteristics provides context for those unfamiliar with this 




Given the centrality of the inter-relationship between the perceiver’s consciousness and 
perceived objects, phenomenological description is never viewed merely as the 
‘abstract’ writing or recording of things without reference to the perceiver/researcher. 
Description, however, can mean very different things for phenomenologists of different 
traditions. For hermeneutic phenomenologists and indeed for most sociological- 
phenomenologists, there is no description without interpretation, for any description 
provides:  ‘not a copy of the world, but a hermeneutics’ (Spurling, 1977: 168).  Forms 
of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology, on the other hand, aspire to describe a 
phenomenon by suspending as far as possible prior knowledge, assumptions, attitudes 
and interpretations enveloping it, in order to arrive at its essential core meanings. This 
is undertaken via the processes of epochē and reduction. 
2) Epochē and reduction 
These concepts have been subject to intense contestation and Husserl himself never 
precisely defined what these processes were; phenomenological researchers employ the 
 15 
terms in a plethora of ways (Gearing 2004).  The notion of ‘epochē’, from the Greek to 
abstain, stop, or keep a distance from, dates back to the ancient Skeptics and was used 
by Husserl to denote the attempt to suspend all taken-for-granted assumptions and 
presuppositions about a phenomenon.  The skeptical epochē is a process,  ‘which places 
in question all [the philosopher’s] hitherto existing convictions, which forbids in advance 
any judgmental use of them, forbids taking any position as to their validity or invalidity‘ 
(Husserl 1970: 76). It is thus the suspending or temporary bracketing3 of the ‘natural 
attitude’, our taken-for-granted, everyday assumptions about a phenomenon, including 
‘scientific‘ abstractions, in order to arrive at and describe its essential characteristics, to 
be faithful to the thing itself.   
For Husserl, once the natural attitude has been suspended via the first stage of 
epochē, eidetic reduction was used to make sense of what remained, to reduce the 
phenomenon to an exemplar of an essence or an eidos. This, for him, required a further 
level of reduction, the transcendental reduction to the ‘absolutely unique, ultimately 
functioning ego‘ (Husserl 1970: 186), and thus to transcendental subjectivity.  For 
sociological-phenomenological researchers, we depart from Husserl’s thinking at this 
point, for complete bracketing of the socio-cultural situatedness of our descriptions and 
understandings is acknowledged to be an impossibility; we cannot stand outside our 
cultural frame of reference (including our language structures).  What is useful to us, 
however, is the exhortation to make best efforts reflexively and systematically to be 
aware of our assumptions and standpoints, and to render these explicit.  In sports 
studies for instance, it is possible to take the descriptions provided by participants 
themselves and subject these to analysis by bracketing as far as possible our prior 
assumptions regarding the phenomenon, for example by making the familiar strange, 
explicitly recording and critically questioning our own conceptualisations of the 
                                                          
3
 Although there are nuanced differences of meaning between the terms epochē and 
bracketing, they are often used synonymously and interchangeably to refer to the change in 
attitude necessary for philosophical inquiry. Following Gearing (2004), and for the purposes of 
this article, I use the terms epochē and bracketing as synonyms, whilst cognisant that this is by 
no means accepted practice across phenomenological traditions.  
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phenomenon, or using researcher  triangulation.  Methods of bracketing utilised in a 
recent research project on women’s running are considered below. 
3) Essences 
The purpose of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction is to distil a phenomenon, to 
reduce it to its eidos, devoid of the usual tacit, taken-for-granted assumptions enveloping 
it. For Husserl (1970), a central aim of phenomenology was the discovery of the essential 
patterns or structures of an experience, in order to create a systematic and disciplined 
methodology for the derivation of knowledge. But, as Ehrich (1999: 23) emphasizes, for 
later phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty, arriving at such description is not the 
culmination, but merely a starting point in seeking to understand the experience.  The 
concept of ‘essences’ has been widely debated, particularly in relation to notions of 
universality and the independence of essences from social context. For sociological- 
phenomenologists,  the emphasis is on the situatedness of experience so that essences 
are acknowledged to be socially constituted, culture- and context-bound. For us, the 
essence coheres around the recognition of generalities in the phenomenon, rather than 
making a definitive statement about its invariance.  
4) Intentionality 
Intentionality is the notion that consciousness is always consciousness of something; it is 
thus intentional, orientated towards something/someone. As Willig (2008: 52) neatly 
phrases it: ‘Intentionality allows objects to appear as phenomena’, and explains why 
different people experience the ‘same’  thing in sometimes radically different ways. So, if 
whilst out running I think I see a snake in the grass, then I have a ‘snake-in-the-grass’ 
experience, whether or not the snake is actually ‘real’. Merleau-Ponty (2001) 
distinguishes between two kinds of intentionality: intentionality of acts, when we 
consciously and voluntarily take up a position; and operative intentionality, a kind of pre-
reflective intentionality, a background-noise setting to our lives, only brought to light via 
the reduction (see Reuter, 1999 for a concise explanation).  Whilst Husserl focussed upon 
the intentionality of mind, Merleau-Ponty (2001) highlights bodily intentionality – the 
body as an attitude directed toward an existing or potential task.  For him, intentionality, 
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perception and action are fundamentally intertwined; all elements apposite to 
sociological-phenomenological analyses of sporting experiences. 
 These, then, are four key elements in the Husserlian phenomenological method, 
subsequently developed and revised within different forms of phenomenology. For many 
sociological-phenomenologists, any research method able to generate detailed 
descriptions of participants’ concrete lived experiences of a phenomenon, can provide 
data for the application of phenomenologically-inspired analysis.  Phenomenological 
researchers in the social sciences have, however, sometimes found themselves subject to 
criticism for non-participation in the phenomenon/a under study, as Gruppetta (2004) 
points out.  Although a phenomenological researcher’s use of second-hand accounts need 
not necessarily be construed as a weakness of method, autoethnographic 
phenomenology or ‘autophenomenography’ provides an interesting avenue for addressing 
such criticism. 
 Gruppetta (2004) and Allen-Collinson (2009), working from within social-scientific 
forms of phenomenology, contend that if an autoethnographic researcher analyzes 
her/his own experiences of a phenomenon rather than of a ‘cultural place’ - as in 
autoethnography - then an appropriate term would be ‘autophenomenography’.  
Autophenomenography is thus an autobiographical genre in which the phenomenological 
researcher is both researcher and participant in her/study of a particular phenomenon, 
subjecting her/his own lived experience to sustained and rigorous phenomenological 
analysis (Allen-Collinson 2011). Here it should be noted that I choose the term 
‘autophenomenography’ rather than ‘autophenomenology’ for two reasons.  First, as with 
ethnography and its offspring, autoethnography, ‘graphy’ is taken to delineate the 
research process as well as the written or other representational product of that process.  
Second, autophenomenology has specific – and contested -  meanings within 
phenomenology (see for example, Drummond 2007; Marbach 2007) and there is not the 
scope here to delve into these debates.  Briefly to ‘ground’ the article with some data, I 





To contextualise the research, whilst falling firmly within the non-élite category, I am 
highly committed, a ‘serious runner’ whose running encompasses two of Bale’s (2004) 
forms: 1) welfare running, pursued for health and fitness aims; and also 2) performance 
running, pursued in order to improve and sustain performance.  Although ‘performance’ 
is usually employed in relation to élite athletes, elements can usefully be applied to 
‘serious runners’, who: ‘regularly [run] further and faster than fitness for health would 
demand’ (Smith 2000: 190).  As part of an autophenomenographic project on 
middle/long-distance running, I maintained a research log for a period of 2.5 years 
(ongoing), which includes highly detailed descriptions of my subjective and corporeal 
experiences during training sessions.  
  The research adheres to  Giorgi’s (1985, 1997) descriptive, empirical-
phenomenological guidelines, and includes the following elements: i) the collection of 
concrete descriptions of phenomena from an ‘insider’ perspective; ii) the adoption of the 
phenomenological attitude; iii) initial impressionistic readings of the descriptions to gain 
a feel for the whole; iv) in-depth re-reading of these descriptions as part of a process of 
data-immersion, to identify themes and sub-themes; and v) the production of accounts 
of the essential structure(s) of the experiences.  Given the ideographic nature of the 
research, I depart at this juncture from Giorgi’s method with regard to constructing 
general descriptions across a range of participants. Instead, the focus is upon my own 
lived experiences of a phenomenon. 
 A 23-year career in running gives me some confidence of fulfilling Garfinkel’s 
(2002) phenomenologically-derived  ‘unique adequacy requirement’ for the analyst to be 
familiar with the phenomenon. This requirement of familiarity can, however, render 
problematic another key element of the phenomenological method, epochē, thus 
requiring heightened reflexivity of the ‘insider’ researcher.   In order to bracket (in a 
sociological-phenomenological sense) my own preconceptions about female running in 
public space, I engaged in two bracketing practices to make the familiar strange: 1) 
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discussions with both insiders and non-insiders to the distance-running subculture, 
female and male; 2) in-depth reading of ethnographic accounts of other sporting 
activities in order to compare and contrast the key elements of these with the running 
experience. Whilst straying from Husserl’s idealistic notion of epochē, this process did 
challenge my ‘fore-conceptions’ and  increase reflexivity by identifying many tacit 
assumptions.  I now portray an instance from the data, which demonstrates feminist- 
phenomenological analysis of a lived experience of danger.     
As context, the majority of my training currently takes place as a solo female 
runner in public space. Feminist writers have long identified the gendered nature of 
space, including the dangers to women moving in and through ‘public’ space (e.g. 
Valentine 1989). My running in public space is thus lived and felt at the individual, 
subjective level, but is also deeply structurally-shaped by my difficulty, as a woman, in 
securing ‘an undisputed right’ to occupy that space (Hanmer and Saunders 1984).  
Running in public space can render women -and men also - vulnerable to verbal and 
physical harassment, even assault, and there appears to be a strongly gendered element 
to this harassment (Smith 2000).  
Over the years, I have been subject to varying degrees of verbal and physical 
harassment; men/teenage boys have lunged and grabbed at various parts of my 
anatomy. The embodied consequences of such abuse and attack mean that at times 
when corporeal vulnerability is brought forcibly to the forefront of my consciousness,  I 
run warily, eyes and ears on full alert, breath at times shallow so that I can better listen 
for sounds.  My running body is no longer the running habit-body, at ease with itself and 
the environment, but is brought vividly and jarringly to consciousness.  My bodily 
intentionality is also redirected from other important running elements, such as the 
terrain underfoot, ‘obstacles’ such as pedestrians and cars, to potential or actual 
attackers.  A log entry testifies to some key phenomenological elements: intentionality, 
the mind-body nexus, and problems of bracketing, in relation to an incident that turned 




Phew, strange run tonight.  Out along the river meadows quite some way from 
the city and approaching the weir.  Suddenly out of the blue, a red  pick-up 
truck is hurtling its way across the field towards me down the track toward the 
river. I had spotted the truck previously careering across the fields, but within 
sight and earshot of dog-walkers and others, I had paid it little heed.  Now 
there is no one in sight, and the houses bordering the river are some way off 
on the other bank.  Is that a shot gun sticking out of the open passenger 
window?  I catch male voices drifting toward me on the evening air.  Heart 
pounding in my ears now - quiet, quiet, I order – I need to be able to hear 
and think.  Try to steady breathing, better to concentrate. The truck is still 
approaching down the grassy track, bumping and swaying. I up the pace, pull 
down my baseball hat firmly and set my jaw sternly.  I will my body harder, 
leaner, tauter, try to look focussed and ‘don’t mess with me’.  Not for the first 
time, I wish my slight, 5’3” runner’s body were somewhat more imposing.  
Suddenly breath-catchingly, the truck veers off the track a few metres in front 
of me. I hear loud male voices and a radio blaring.  Heart still pounding out 
time.  Just in case, as I up the pace to get out of the danger zone, I tack from 
side to side… in order to make myself a more difficult target. 
 
Via sociological-phenomenological bracketing of my long experience of similar encounters 
resulting in verbal or physical harassment, the above response appears bizarre, 
unfounded and melodramatic.  On the basis of experience, however, I cannot discount 24 
years’ running, and many more of being a woman moving in and through public space, 
which have honed my habit-body/mind. The challenges of attempting epochē are forcibly 





Concluding - not  conclusive - thoughts 
In this article, I have explored just some of the possibilities offered by sociological- 
phenomenology for researching lived sporting-body experiences, and by feminist 
phenomenology for examining female sporting embodiment specifically.  Commensurate 
with the phenomenological tradition, which emphasizes the incompleteness of all 
knowledge and understanding, I must emphasize that this account is of course very 
partial -  because of my own specific characteristics (gender, age, socio-cultural location, 
ability etc), and because we can never capture or convey fully the essential structures of 
lived experience. We can only try our best to engage in the ‘breathing of meaning’ (van 
Manen 2000) and to share our lived experience.  Likewise, feminist phenomenology 
provides just one of a myriad of different ways to research and represent women’s 
sporting experience and embodiment.  Importantly too, it is explicit about its standpoint 
and partialness. It seeks to generate accounts that locate the specifics of individual 
experience within broader social structures, including the gender order.  
Sociological-phenomenology can provide not only a strong theoretical and 
methodological framework for examining human subjectivity and embodiment in general, 
but allied to feminism is particularly well-suited to the analytic task of charting women’s 
lived-body sporting experiences and the specifics of socially-relating, gendered bodies 
within a particular social structure.  In common with any theoretical and methodological 
approach, there are of course limitations, but feminist phenomenology’s insistence on 
taking seriously, and remaining faithful to the phenomena portrayed in women’s own 
experiential accounts, grounded in both the material-corporeal body and in a wider 
social-structural framework, provides a potent analytic framework.  This form of 
phenomenology encourages reflection upon, and empathic understanding of, how it feels 
to be the woman in the lived sporting body; a body that is also, as sociology emphasizes, 
inscribed and imbued with socio-cultural meanings, significances, purposes and interests. 
 
Word count: 7481 
 22 
References 
Allen-Collinson, J. 2009. Sporting embodiment: Sports studies and the (continuing) 
promise of phenomenology. Qualitative Research in Sport and Exercise 1 (3): 279-
296.  
Allen-Collinson, J. 2010. Running embodiment, power and vulnerability: Notes towards a 
feminist phenomenology of female running.  In Women and Exercise: The Body, 
Health and Consumerism, edited by E. Kennedy and P. Markula (pp. 280-298). 
London: Routledge. 
Allen-Collinson, J. 2011. Intention and epochē in tension: autophenomenography, 
bracketing and a novel approach to researching sporting embodiment. Qualitative 
Research in Sport & Exercise 3 (1): 48-62. 
Allen-Collinson, J. and J. Hockey. 2011 in press. Feeling the way: notes toward a haptic 
phenomenology of scuba diving and distance running. International Review for the 
Sociology of Sport. 
Arnold, P.J. 1979. Meaning in movement, sport and physical education. London: 
Heinemann. 
Bale, J. 2004.  Running cultures.  London: Routledge. 
Bar-On Cohen, E. 2006. Kime and the moving body: Somatic codes in Japanese martial 
arts.  Body & Society 12 (4): 73-93. 
de Beauvoir, S. 1972. The second sex (trans. H. Parshley). Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books.  
de Beauvoir, S. 2009. The second sex (trans. C. Borde and S. Malovany-Chevallier). 
London: Jonathan Cape. 
Berger, P.L. and Luckmann, T. 1967.  The social construction of reality. A treatise in the 
sociology of knowledge. Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor. 
Butler, J. 2006. Sexual difference as a question of ethics: Alterities of the flesh in Irigaray 
and Merleau-Ponty.  In Feminist interpretations of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, edited by 
 23 
D. Olkowski and G. Weiss (pp.107-125). University Park, PA: Penn State University 
Press. 
Breivik, G. 2010.  Being-in-the-void: A Heideggerian analysis of skydiving.  Journal of 
Philosophy of Sport 37 (1): 29-46. 
Chisholm, D. 2008. Climbing like a girl: An exemplary adventure in feminist 
phenomenology. Hypatia 23 (1): 9-40. 
Crossley, N. 2001. The social body: Habit, identity and desire. London: Sage. 
Csordas, T. 2002. Body/meaning/healing.  New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Drummond, J. J. 2007. Phenomenology: neither auto- nor hetero- be. Phenomenology 
and the Cognitive Sciences 6: 57–74. 
Ehrich, L.C. 1999. Untangling the threads and coils of the web of phenomenology.  
Education Research and Perspectives 26 (2): 19-44. 
Embree, L. and J. N. Mohanty. 1997. Introduction.  In Encyclopaedia of Phenomenology 
edited by L. Embree et al. (pp. 1-10).  Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Finlay, L. 2009. Debating phenomenological research methods.  Phenomenology & 
Practice 3 (1): 6-25. 
Fisher, L. 2000. Phenomenology and feminism: Perspectives on their relation.  In 
Feminist phenomenology, edited by L. Fisher and L. Embree (pp.17-37). Dordrecht, 
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Fisher, L. and L. Embree, eds. 2000.  Feminist phenomenology. Dordrecht, Netherlands: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Garfinkel, H. 1984. Studies in ethnomethodology, 2nd revised edition.  Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Garfinkel, H. 2002. Ethnomethodology’s program: Working out Durkheim’s aphorism. 
New York: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Gearing, R. E. 2004. Bracketing in research: A typology.  Qualitative Health Research 14 
(10): 1429-1452. 
 24 
Giorgi, A. ed. 1985. Phenomenology and psychological research.  Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press. 
Giorgi, A.P. 1997. The theory, practice and evaluation of the phenomenological method 
as a qualitative research procedure. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 28 
(2): 235-260. 
Grosz, E. 1994. Volatile bodies: Toward a corporeal feminism.  Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press. 
Gruppetta, M. 2004. Autophenomenography? Alternative uses of autobiographically 
based research.  In Association for Active Researchers in Education (AARE) 
Conference Paper Abstracts – 2004, edited by P. L. Jeffery. Sydney: AARE.  
Retrieved June 9, 2009, from: http://www.aare.edu.au/04pap/gru04228.pdf.  
Hall, M. A. 1996. Feminism and sporting bodies: Essays on theory and practice. 
Champaign, Il: Human Kinetics. 
Hanmer, J. and S. Saunders. 1984. Well-founded fear: A community study of violence to 
women.  London: Hutchinson. 
Heidegger, M.  1962. Being and time.  Oxford: Blackwell. 
Hemphill, D. 2005. Deeper inside the beautiful game. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 
XXXII: 105-115. 
Hockey, J. and J. Allen-Collinson. 2007. Grasping the phenomenology of sporting bodies.  
International Review for the Sociology of Sport 42 (2): 115-131. 
Hughson, J. and D. Inglis. 2002. Inside the beautiful game: Towards a Merleau-Pontian 
phenomenology of soccer play.  Journal of the Philosophy of Sport XXIX: 1-15. 
Husserl, E. 1970. The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology 
(trans. D. Carr).  Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. 
Husserl, E. 1983. Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological 
philosophy: First book (trans. F. Kersten). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.   
Jennings, J.L. 1986. Husserl revisited: The forgotten distinction between psychology and 
phenomenology. American Psychologist 41 (11): 1231-1240. 
 25 
Katz, J. and T.J. Csordas. 2003. Phenomenological ethnography in sociology and 
anthropology.  Ethnography 4 (3): 275–288. 
Kerry, D.S. and K.M. Armour. 2000. Sport sciences and the promise of phenomenology: 
Philosophy, method, and insight.  Quest 52 (1): 1-17. 
Liberman, K. 2009. The itinerary of intersubjectivity in social phenomenological research.  
Schutzian research. A Yearbook of lifeworldly phenomenology and qualitative social 
science 1: 149-164. 
Marbach, E. 2007. No heterophenomenology without autophenomenology: Variations on 
a theme of mine.  Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):  75-87. 
Martín Alcoff, L.  2000.  Phenomenology, post-structuralism, and feminist theory on the 
concept of experience.  In Feminist phenomenology, edited by L. Fisher and L. 
Embree (pp. 39-56). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Masciotra, D., E. Ackermann and W.-M. Roth. 2001. ‘Maai’: The art of distancing in 
Karate-Do: Mutual attunement in close encounters. Journal of Adult Development 8 
(2): 119-132. 
Maso, I. 2001. Phenomenology and ethnography. In Handbook of ethnography, edited by 
P. Atkinson, A. Coffey, S. Delamont, J. Lofland and L. Lofland (pp. 136–144). 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage,  
Merleau-Ponty, M. 1963. The structure of behaviour (trans. A.L. Fisher). Boston: Beacon 
Press. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. 1969. The visible and the invisible (trans. A. Lingis). Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. 2001. Phenomenology of perception (trans. C. Smith). London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul.  
Moe, V. F. 2004. How to understand skill acquisition in sport. Bulletin of Science, 
Technology & Society 24 (3): 213-224. 
Morley, J. 2001. Inspiration and expiration: Yoga practice through Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of the body.  Philosophy East and West 51 (1): 73-82. 
 26 
Mortari, L. and M. Tarozzi. 2010. Phenomenology as philosophy of research: An 
introductory essay. In Phenomenology and human science research today, edited 
by L. Mortari and M. Tarozzi (pp. 9-54). Bucharest: Zeta Books. 
Olkowski, D. and G. Weiss, eds. 2006. Feminist interpretations of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 
University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. 
Preston, B. 1996. Merleau-Ponty and feminine embodied existence. Man and World 29 
(2): 167-186. 
Pringle, R. 2009. Defamiliarizing heavy-contract sports: A critical examination of rugby, 
discipline, and pleasure.  Sociology of Sport Journal 26 (2): 211-234. 
Psathas, G., ed. 1973. Phenomenological sociology: Issues and applications. London: 
John Wiley. 
Reuter, M. (1999) Merleau-Ponty’s notion of pre-reflective intentionality.  Synthèse, 
118: 69-88. 
Ryba, T. 2008. Researching children in sport: Methodological reflections.  Journal of 
Applied Sport Psychology 20 (3): 334-348. 
Samudra, J. K. 2008. Memory in our body: Thick participation and the translation of 
kinaesthetic experience.  American Ethnologist 35 (4): 665-681. 
Schutz, A. 1967. Phenomenology of the social world (trans. G. Walsh and F. Lehnert). 
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. 
Schutz, A. and T. Luckmann. 1973. The structures of the life-world: Volume 1. Evanston, 
IL: Northwestern University Press. 
Smith, S.L. 2000. British nonélite road running and masculinity.  A case of ‘running 
repairs’? Men and Masculinities 3 (2): 187-208. 
Spiegelberg, H. 1982. The phenomenological movement. 3rd and revised edition. 
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff. 
Spurling, L. 1977. Phenomenology and the social world.  The philosophy of Merleau-
Ponty and its relation to the social sciences.  London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
 27 
Sutton, J. 2007. Batting, habit and memory: The embodied mind and the nature of skill. 
Sport in Society 10 (5): 763-786. 
Valentine, G. 1989. The geography of women’s fear.  Area 21: 385-390. 
 
Van Manen, M. 2000. Professonal  practice and ‘doing phenomenology’.  In  Handbook of 
Phenomenology and Medicine, edited by S. K.Toombs. London: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. 
Wacquant, L. 2004.  Body and soul: Notebooks of an apprentice boxer.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Wagner, H. R. 1973. The scope of phenomenological sociology: Considerations and 
suggestions.  In Phenomenological sociology: Issues and applications, edited by G. 
Psathas (pp. 61-87). London: John Wiley. 
Wearing, B. 1998. Leisure and feminist theory. London: Sage. 
Whitehead, M. 2007. Physical literacy: Philosophical considerations in relation to 
developing a sense of self, universality and propositional knowledge. Sport, Ethics 
and Philosophy 1 (3): 281-298. 
Willig, C. 2008. Introducing qualitative research in psychology. 2nd ed.  Milton Keynes: 
Open University Press/McGraw Hill. 
Young, I.M. 1980. Throwing like a girl: A phenomenology of feminine body comportment, 
motility and spatiality. Human Studies 3 (2): 137-156. 
Young, I.M. 1998. ‘Throwing like a girl’: Twenty years later. In Body and flesh: A 
philosophical reader, edited by D. Welton (pp. 286-290). Oxford: Blackwell.  
